主讲人：简思思 助理教授

邀请人：王书玲 助理教授

时间：2024年12月19日（周四）下午14:00-16:00

地点：通达馆103会议室

主讲人简介：

        简思思博士就职于香港科技大学土木与环境工程学系，任助理教授，博士毕业于新南威尔士大学 (University of New South Wales, Australia) School of Civil and Environmental Engineering。简思思主要从事多模式交通网络系统建模与优化、博弈论及机制设计理论的研究。主持有香港杰出青年学者计划基金、香港优配研究金、德国与香港合作研究计划、国家自然科学基金青年基金、美国福特公司研究基金等。在国际期刊共发表论文SCI/SSCI论文三十余篇，包括交通运输领域的主流期刊Transportation Research Part A,B,C,D,E, AAP, IEEE T-ITS等。2018年获得亚洲院长论坛Rising Stars: Women in Engineering提名，2021和2024年分别获得国际多模式交通研究学术会议“Best Presentation Award”和“Best Paper Award”，2023年获得CTS“Best Paper Award”。

主讲内容简介：

        The phenomenon of transportation service providers (TSPs) engaging in both competition and cooperation, commonly referred to as coopetition, has become increasingly prevalent in the transportation market. This is driven by the rapid advancements in information technology and sharing economy. In practice, competitive TSPs can engage in a resource exchange scheme to share their resources to improve their service quality. However, such a resource exchange scheme may not be sustained since the service prices and profits will be further changed due to the competition in the end market. This study proposes a two-stage sequential-move game to characterize the coopetition problem between TSPs, wherein the first-stage resource exchange problem is modeled with a Nash bargaining game, and the second-stage pricing problem is modeled with a non-cooperative Nash game. Different from prior studies, our model incorporates the supply–demand congestion effects and the asymmetric bargaining power of TSPs. The subsequent impacts on social welfare, TSPs, and end users are investigated. Analytical results show that only when the unit price of the exchanged resources decreases in the exchanged resource quantity will the resource-exchange scheme succeed. Furthermore, we find that TSPs prefer to leave some “buffer zone” in between to avoid fierce competition with price wars.

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